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‘‘The world of the romances,’’ writes Richard Kieck-
hefer, ‘‘seems at times a vast toy shop stocked with magical delights.’’1
Kieckhefer’s popular history of magic in the Middle Ages thus casts the
enchanting pull of romances as a fantasy associated with childhood. The
toy-shop metaphor may seem odd for the medieval context, however.
Following the work of Philippe Arie`s, social historians have long sur-
mised that childhood did not properly exist during the Middle Ages, a
hard-scrabble time (apparently) little able to afford the trifles of child-
hood play.2
This assumption has come under important revision in recent years,
a move corroborated by the discovery of large numbers of hollow pewter
trinkets—many of them obviously children’s toys—found preserved in
the riverbed of the Thames. Hollow-cast figurines of knights datable,
from their depiction of armor, to c. 1300, presumably for boys; minia-
ture metal tableware and pottery ostensibly for girls; lead-alloy hollow
heads—including one that may be a Christ figure, a grotesque, and two
that resemble a ‘‘caricatured Jewish head’’ with pointed hat, all of which
may have been puppet heads;3 one remarkable hollow-metal miniature
Comments on earlier versions of this essay have improved it considerably. I am par-
ticularly grateful to Judith Anderson, Constance Furey, Shannon Gayk, Frank Grady,
Shawn Hughes, and Elizabeth Scala, and to audiences at Purdue University and at the
University of Missouri, Columbia. Special thanks to Peter Travis, and the anonymous
reader for SAC for helpful comments and suggestions.
1 Magic in the Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 107.
2 Philippe Arie`s famously denied childhood to the medieval period. The bibliography
disputing this claim is increasingly vast. See, particularly, N. Orme, Medieval Childhood
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001).
3 Here quoting Geoff Egan. Hazel Forsyth with Geoff Egan, Toys, Trifles, and Trinkets:
Base Metal Miniatures from London 1200 to 1800 (London: Museum of London Unicorn
Press, 2005), 142.
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bird or fledgling, originally with moving parts that ‘‘enabled the bird to
bob and its tongue to go in and out’’;4 and significantly, a mold clearly
used to produce quantities of toys. On the basis of these findings, Geoff
Egan of the British Museum and Hazel Forsyth of the Museum of Lon-
don hypothesize the mass-production of lead-alloy playthings, ‘‘more for
a mass market than [as] the privileged treasures of a rich elite.’’5 These
artifacts suggest not only that childhood existed during the Middle Ages
but also that considerable technological skill was dedicated to its enter-
tainments. They also make one wonder why social historians have been
so quick to assume a Middle Ages without children or childhood
play—an idea that is, relative to the evidence, ‘‘virtually baseless,’’ as
Egan puts it.6 On the one hand, these little nothings of medieval social
and cultural production, the toys, gadgets, and frivolous entertainments
surviving from the period whether in the mud of the Thames or in the
pages of medieval romance have been catalogued in the work of such
scholars as Kieckhefer, Scott Lightsey, or William Eamon.7 On the other
hand, such productions are rarely featured in technological histories,
despite the evidence they give of developments in technology.
Weberian sociology reserves technological advance for those things
associated with production, not leisure, for usable, not ‘‘frivolous,’’
items. Histories of medieval technology stress the innovative power of
flying buttresses, windmills, or cannons, yet ignore the drolleries of
medieval romance, implicitly viewing them as trivial, not unlike the
delicate ceramic glazes or Ming vases fashioned by Asian artists. Max
Weber is of course the author of the powerful story of modern disen-
chantment, positing the historical transformation from a premodern
4 Ibid., 143.
5 Ibid., 59. Egan continues, ‘‘The best of the latest work on medieval childhood now
fully acknowledges playthings in the sense used in this volume as a reality. There remain
others who are skeptical or simply uninformed from archaeological sources.’’ And, on
the question of the mass market: ‘‘Of course, those without any spare money would not
have been able to afford such trifles, but within towns there would have been many
families for whom the occasional indulgence of a few pence on their children would
have been easily expendable.’’
6 Ibid., 58. As Egan and Forsyth point out, an earlier inability to recognize these
artifacts as, in fact, toys has much to do with assumptions made about the absence of
childhood during the time.
7 In addition to Kieckhefer’s Magic in the Middle Ages, see Lightsey, ‘‘Chaucer’s Secular
Marvels and the Medieval Economy of Wonder,’’ SAC 23 (2001): 289–316, and Man-
made Marvels in Medieval Culture and Literature (New York: Palgrave, 2007); William
Eamon, ‘‘Technology as Magic in the Late Middle Ages and the Renaissance,’’ Janus 70
(1983): 171–212.
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magical sense of wonder in the world to a modern understanding of the
world as accessible to calculation.8 Medieval toys seem disqualified on
two counts: not only are they items of play, but they date from the time
before widespread technological reckoning.
To be sure, there is much to recommend the story of disenchantment,
much that resonates with the trackings of culture over the longue dure´e.
Yet Weber’s work cannot help us to assess the productive impulse of
this mass market in medieval toys. Criticism of Weber is not new: his
earliest Marxist critics, including Christopher Hill and R. H. Tawney,
pointed out the errors in his account of Protestantism; more recently
Afshin Matin-Asgari, Wolfgang Schluchter, and others have critiqued
Weber’s statements about non-Western cultures as predicated on slim
knowledge of Islam in its various historical settings.9 In a survey of the
field of Islamic Studies, Matin-Asgari points out the ambitious reach of
these problems and calls for a rethinking of Weber’s ‘‘deeply ethnocen-
tric’’ fallacy: ‘‘defin[ing] societies, or historical eras, primarily in terms
of their cultural ‘ethos,’ often articulated in religion,’’ deserves to be
rethought, especially since it is ultimately predicated upon a ‘‘rigid and
stagnant [view of] ‘non-Western’ cultural and religious norms.’’10 To
make the obvious point: even when construed dialectically, Western
‘‘disenchantment’’ depends upon more fully enchanted (and religiously
primitive) times and places (the Middle Ages; the ‘‘East’’). Despite their
differences, these cultures occupy the same place in Weber’s thought;
inherently premodern, they are characterized by a singular unwilling-
ness to view the world in calculable terms.
With regard to the Middle Ages, however, consider the following
from Isidore of Seville: ‘‘Take calculation from the world and all is enve-
loped in dark ignorance, nor can he who does not know the way to
reckon be distinguished from the rest of the animals.’’11 The philosophi-
cal debates of the twelfth century—the dialectics of scholasticism in
8 See, for example, Max Weber, ‘‘Science as Vocation,’’ in Weber, From Max Weber:
Essays in Sociology, ed H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1981).
9 Afshin Matin-Asgari, ‘‘Islamic Studies and the Spirit of Max Weber: A Critique of
Cultural Essentialism,’’ Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies 13, no. 3 (2004): 293–
312. Toby E. Huff and Wolfgang Schluchter, eds., Max Weber and Islam (New Bruns-
wick: Transaction Publishers, 1999).
10 Ibid., 310.
11 The Etymologies of Isidore of Seville, trans. Stephen A. Barney et al., with the collabo-
ration of Muriel Hall (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
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the quarrel over universals, for instance—suggest a deep propensity for
questioning and reckoning, if not for precisely the kind of calculation
that Weber has in mind. Medieval thinkers were not as preoccupied as
were later natural scientists with calculating the vital life force. The
infinite God, and not a calculable life force, was for them the source of
human vitality; this distinction inhabited Weber’s writings on the na-
ture of medieval enchantment. But medieval scholastics were equally
interested in reckoning evidence from the world, even as their calcula-
tions directed them toward different conclusions.
Wonder and enchantment are not without their darker sides.12 Wit-
ness the evidence of medieval toys described earlier: the toy as stereotyp-
ical Jewish head, the apparently gendered arrangements of domestic
and military playthings, remind us that childhood, whatever its magical
delights, also constitutes a training ground for later ideological beliefs.
Yet childhood enchantments tend to be read more optimistically than
their adult counterparts, regularly linked, in the affective register, to an
absorption with matter and a delight in the natural world. Raymond
Williams most famously made the point: his evocative description of
the ‘‘feeling of childhood’’ associates it with the ‘‘feeling of the country’’
and with the very old days of England, each the time before the com-
modification of people and things.13
Kieckhefer’s metaphor of medieval romance as a vast toy shop implic-
itly argues this case: the magical fancies that delighted adult audiences
during the Middle Ages are ancestor to the modern playthings of child-
hood. Nor is he alone: such romances as Guy of Warwick were, of course,
recast and popularly marketed as children’s literature during the eigh-
teenth century and beyond; the attitudes of a medieval ‘‘age of faith’’
are regularly said to converge upon the habits of magical thinking oper-
ative before the ‘‘age of reason,’’ whether understood culturally or sub-
jectively—that is, whether that age applies to the putatively more
secular period known as the Enlightenment or to the age of a particular
individual in the acquisition of seven years. To assume that medieval
enchantment survives modernity via the delights of childhood casts
12 Recent work on medieval romance has made this case forcefully. See my Sovereign
Fantasies: Arthurian Romance and the Making of Britain (Philadelphia: University of Penn-
sylvania Press, 2001); see also Geraldine Heng, Empire of Magic (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2006).
13 Raymond Williams, The Country and the City (New York: Oxford University Press,
1973), 297–98.
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Western history as a Bildungsroman, a narrative of maturation that im-
plicitly renders medieval childhood an oxymoron. If modern childhood
is defined by its preservation of an enchantment identified with the Mid-
dle Ages tout court (and is thus a feature of adult medieval subjectivity),
how are we to make sense of the category of the medieval child? How,
after all, would one distinguish the enchantments of childhood within a
period marked in principle by an enchanted sensibility? That is, the
long-standing association of the medieval period with enchantment may
have helped produce the assumption that childhood was culturally im-
possible for it. A Middle Ages without childhood can of course usefully
serve the developmental-historical view of the rise of scientific calcula-
tion, one that relocates the future of enchantment in the sensibilities of
the modern child, a view that not incidentally seems to evacuate the
complications of history and childhood both.
Recent reassessments of Weber’s account of disenchantment trouble
the standard reading of the opposition between enchantment and disen-
chantment in his work, stressing the importance of absorption and de-
light for a material (and ethical) engagement with the world. Jane
Bennett and Alan Sica have each argued that modern experiences of
enchantment are more crucial to Weber’s story of disenchantment than
has heretofore been recognized. Weber, they each argue, preserves en-
chantment in the nooks and crannies of disenchanted culture. Magical
elements remain, in the words of Sica, ‘‘fragmented but still powerful.’’14
As Bennett puts it, ‘‘Disenchantment does not mean that we live in a
world that has been completely counted up and figured out but rather
that the world has become calculable in principle. It is quite possible for
one to experience aspects of nature that currently defy understanding
and still affirm the principle of the scientific calculability of the world.
In [Weber’s] disenchanted world, the principle of calculability tends to
overrule, even if it does not overpower, experience.’’15 The development-
14 Alan Sica, Weber, Irrationality, and Social Order (Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univer-
sity of California Press, 1988), 168.
15 Jane Bennett, The Enchantment of Modern Life (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2001), 59. Bennett stresses that, under the conditions of modernity, ‘‘the princi-
ple of calculability tends to overrule, even if it does not overpower, experience’’ (emphasis
mine). While both verbs allude to dynamics of power, ‘‘rule’’ attends more specifically
to strategies of sovereign, institutional, and bureaucratic ordering, to governmentality
and regulation. ‘‘Power,’’ while able to encompass all of the above, also alludes to the
phenomenological, affective element of experience, the ways in which the human subject
is moved, her attachments formed by way of interest, curiosity, absorption, and delight.
This deployment of phenomenological approaches—important to the work of theorists
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alist uses made of Weber have often played against these subtleties. For
Bennett, such residual enchantment is crucial for the affective impulse
of ethics; she links absorption with matter to a materialist care for the
world, reminding us that such structures of feeling motivate our willing-
ness to devote our limited mortal resources to the people and things of
the world.
Medieval romance regularly engages enchanted sensibilities in an ex-
pansive array of the people and things of this world; recent work on
medieval romance has similarly considered the ethical implications of
such enchantments.16 Chaucer’s Squire’s Tale, I will argue here, is essen-
tially concerned with these same issues, and offers an especially fine site
for considering Bennett’s claim. Enchanting technological invention, the
delights of magical drolleries, birthday gifts given to faraway Mongol
emperor Genghis Khan (Cambyuskan), emerge as compelling in ways
that allude to the ethical mode. By way of its references to a series of
usable little items—magical and technological—this romance crosscuts
disenchanted rationalism with the kind of enchanted absorption in the
new and unusual, a wonder familiar to readers of romance but here
considered in contradictory and complex terms. Depicting enchanted
wonder in the new as both problem and opportunity—as productive
for both traumatic pain and for a compassionate engagement with the
world—the tale raises philosophical issues important to medieval meta-
physics of creation. If, as Marshall Leicester has compellingly shown,
Chaucer’s poetry regularly places the disenchanted self on full display,
The Squire’s Tale reveals the poet’s interest in the uses of fascination and
delight for compassionate engagement with the world.17
like Deleuze and Guattari—offers a way to rethink the condescension with which en-
chanted sensibilities have long been viewed. In her retheorization of an ‘‘enchanted
materialism,’’ Bennett, for example, points to the importance of attachment for ethics,
a point that resonates with other recent efforts at rethinking ethics in psychic and phe-
nomenological terms.
16 If readers of medieval romance found plenty of ways to be enchanted, medievalists
have as often been wary of the enchanting aspects of medieval texts. Critics tend either
to critique the enchantments of romance as religious mystification or colonizing fantasy,
or to emphasize the disenchanting strategies of medieval texts.
17 In a deservedly influential reading of Geoffrey Chaucer’s poetry, Marshall Leicester
deploys a nuanced version of Weber’s notion—one directed at social rather than techni-
cal registers—to argue convincingly for that poet’s disenchanted account of the agency
of the subject in the fourteenth century. Leicester cites Chaucer’s corpus as historical
evidence of disenchanted sensibilities, arguing that it clearly depicts the fourteenth cen-
tury as an era ‘‘in which not only the structures of the Church . . . , but gender roles,
and estates (such as wives and knighthood, and, more generally, subjectivity itself )
[were] deeply affected by a pervasive disenchanted scrutiny.’’ He thus casts Chaucer as
a ‘‘disenchanted agent,’’ the pilgrims from his Canterbury Tales, the ‘‘sufferers and agents
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The Squire’s Tale aims at both. Twinning enchanted desire with techni-
cal curiosity, Chaucer’s tale highlights both the productive power of the
newfangled and the ways that even destabilizing experiences of novelty
might ultimately lead us back to where we started. ‘‘Newefangelnesse’’
is, for one thing, an attribute that the poet explicitly associates not with
technologies of flying machines—technologies, thanks to Leonardo’s
Sketch Book, long linked to Renaissance innovation—but with the in-
controvertibly medieval sensibilities of (so-called) courtly love. Whereas
the tale’s Prima Pars details the court’s delight in and debate over the
fascinations of an innovative gadget, the Pars Secunda tells what seems
only tangentially related, the story of a brokenhearted falcon, aban-
doned by her beloved tercelet for the newfangled attractions of a com-
mon kite.18
Why, after all, does Chaucer link failed love with innovative technol-
ogy? And why is the former, rather than the latter, associated with
a love for the new? Taken together, these two narratives delimit the
problematics of an enchantment with novelty here: newfangled things
fascinate and motivate, as the mechanical horse does for Cambyuskan’s
court; yet that very fascination, as the brokenhearted falcon testifies,
limns the repetitive pains of desire. On the one hand, as we shall see,
The Squire’s Tale makes legible the psychoanalytic insight: the new may
herald—in disguise—the return of something very old. On the other
hand, drolleries like the flying horse startle and stun the senses, present-
ing viewers with unassimilable experience of a radical kind.
Such a collocation might contribute to recent accounts of the revolu-
tionary potential of the novel event precisely as an experience of radical
rupture, a point influentially argued by philosopher Alain Badiou. Badi-
ou’s account is indebted to Jacques Lacan’s rereading of sublimation,
particularly Lacan’s theorizations of the significance of creation ex nihilo.
And Lacan’s account of creative production, detouring as it does
through scholastic philosophy and troubadour poetry, offers an analyti-
of a culture whose cover is blown.’’ Leicester, The Disenchanted Self: Representing the Subject
in the Canterbury Tales (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990),
28.
18 All references to Chaucer’s poem are taken from Larry D. Benson, gen. ed., The
Riverside Chaucer, 3rd ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1987). Of course, as we will see,
the first narrative is instrumental with regard to the second. The second is made possible
by the magical technologies described in the first: Cambyuskan’s daughter Canacee can,
with the magic ring and mirror, now understand the tale of unhappy love that the
wounded falcon tells her.
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cal purchase on the vicissitudes of medieval notions of creativity, one
with implications for a fuller understanding of both the problems and
possibilities inhabiting our attachments to new things. Before turning
to Chaucer’s tale, then, we need to assess an insight from contemporary
theory about which medieval culture seems well aware: that even as it
is filled with utopian promise, novelty can also refigure the compulsions
of the death drive, serving as a screen for impossible desires.
Novelties ex nihilo
Recent interest in the cultural function of novelty seems to come from
an understandable longing for change. Influential theorizations of cul-
tural change range from social science and systems theory—such as
Malcolm Gladwell’s New York Times bestseller The Tipping Point19—to
philosophy, as in Alain Badiou’s ‘‘new universalism.’’20 Gladwell, inter-
ested in isolating the factors that make an innovation ‘‘stick,’’ frames
his central question in part by way of epidemiology: What constitutes
the ‘‘tipping point,’’ when small improvements lead to massive cultural
change? Gladwell wants to offer a how-to guide for cultural change, and
his examples are quotidian—smoking, the sudden hipster popularity of
the heretofore terminally uncool Hush Puppies, the relation of graffiti
to New York City crime statistics, or the transformative splash made by
children’s television programs. Badiou, less concerned with the historical
or sociological aftermath of innovation than he is with the revolutionary
force of what he calls the Event, emphasizes the disorienting power of
novelty as a radical experience of discontinuity, one capable of producing
a new Universalism. The event functions formally for Badiou, a singular,
shattering occurrence emblematized by the narrative of Paul on the road
19 The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference (Boston: Little,
Brown, 2000). Also relevant here is Joel Mokyr’s distinction between ‘‘micro’’ and
‘‘macro’’ innovations; The Lever of Riches: Technological Creativity and Economic Progress
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1992). Mokyr’s learned and ambitious account of
technological change has much to recommend it, particularly his willingness to construe
the oscillating movement of progress through a variety of periods. His notion of prog-
ress, however, rests upon neoliberal economic assumptions about the benefit and nature
of economic growth that can only be assessed in relation to colonialist expansion. His
understanding of the emergence of the Western Europe over Asian and Islamic cultures
does not explicitly engage the role that Western expansionism played, particularly in
the case of Islam.
20 Alain Badiou, Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism, trans. Ray Brassier (Stan-
ford: Stanford University Press, 2003). See particularly Badiou’s comments on Paul’s
role as ‘‘inventor’’ (5–6), and on the ‘‘event’’ (16–30).
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to Damascus—where the former Pharisee becomes a new man, render-
ing Christianity as the new law capable of dissolving the former identi-
ties and loyalties, of slave or free, Greek or Jew, woman or man. To be
sure, the status of the new in Pauline Christianity, as Badiou acknowl-
edges, is paradoxical, regularly serving not (only) hopes for a new and
better universal, but also founding Christian supersessionism, as in
Paul’s notion that the new and living law of Christ supersedes the old,
apparently dead law of Moses and the Prophets. Certainly Badiou makes
legible the revolutionary potential of the (singular) event as a destabiliz-
ing formalization capable of demanding that we abandon old forms and
old pieties.
Yet from a psychoanalytic point of view, Badiou’s example of Paul’s
new law emerges as—even formally—a bit more complicated than he
lets on: Paul’s account of radical innovation embeds a renewal of Jewish
law as much as it constitutes a shattering experience of something not
yet seen or imagined. As a number of critics of Badiou have pointed
out, the radical rupture of a universal Christianity is twinned, in Paul,
with residual features of Jewish community and identity. This is a prob-
lem for Badiou’s philosophy to the extent that he underemphasizes his
Lacanian debts: insofar as novelty is understood as absolute rupture, as
utterly different from (even diametrically opposed to) historical repeti-
tion, it is, from a Lacanian perspective, misrecognized as such. This is
because experiences of the radically new can trick us, constituting
the disguised (or repressed) return to something very old. As Aranye
Fradenburg puts it, ‘‘The Real’s return always generates the effect of the
stunningly new.’’21
To be sure, the formal features of Badiou’s ‘‘new universalism’’ are
fundamentally philosophical rather than psychoanalytic (and indeed, he
argues that it is philosophy, not psychoanalysis, that can best account
for it); his account of rupture is nonetheless indebted to Lacan’s under-
standing of the absence at the heart of creation ex nihilo. Yet where
Badiou emphasizes the singularity (or oneness) of the event, Lacan’s re-
reading of the tradition of creation ex nihilo emphasizes this nihil—that
very nothing important to medieval accounts of divine creative
power—as the sine qua non of sublimation itself. And in a move antici-
pated by Chaucer’s Squire’s Tale, Lacan considers creation ex nihilo along-
side the repetitious patternings of what has come to be called the
discourse of courtly love.
21 ‘‘Simply Marvelous,’’ SAC 26 (2004): 1–26 (16).
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In his much-discussed lecture, ‘‘Courtly Love as Anamorphosis,’’
Lacan argues that the discourse of courtly love historically appeared as
if ex nihilo. This statement highlights Lacan’s paradoxical notion of the
subject (and subjectivization) as, at once, historical and universal. For
Lacan, courtly love occupies a doubled and paradoxical history: it is an
innovative social consensus (as Fradenburg puts it, ‘‘a breakaway mo-
ment in the history of the signifier’’) that emblematizes a recurring,
‘‘universal’’ structure of subjectivity.22 By highlighting courtly love as
emerging ex nihilo, Lacan alludes to the belief that creation ex nihilo
accrues solely to the Divine, with human making constituting a second-
ary rearrangement of things already made. God—preeminent creator,
artisan, maker—produces out of nothing; human making, in contrast,
can only rearrange, recompose, rework those things already in the
world, just as Adam and Eve, themselves divinely created from nothing
but dust, fashioned coverings from fig leaves found in Eden, the perfect
garden already made by God. Their modesty, while certainly ‘‘new’’ in
postlapsarian Eden, constitutes not an innovative push forward, but that
‘‘fall’’ backwards from which humankind has never recovered, the exem-
plary definition of human degeneration. The Franciscan theologian Bon-
aventure (1221–1275) offers an emblematic version of the limitations
posed to humanity’s claim to the new: ‘‘The soul is able to make new
compositions [of what it receives from the external world], but not new
things.’’23 Hugh of St. Victor (1096–1141) makes a similar point, one
that Bonaventure will develop further, delineating a hierarchy of cre-
ative agents: God (who operates ex nihilo), nature (operating ens in po-
tentia), and human artists (who produce ens completum), following after
nature. Human artifice is, in this view, a means of forming things ‘‘me-
chanical, that is adulterate,’’ as Hugh puts it.24 In contrast to the me-
chanical, adulterated, inferior composite creations made by human
artisans, there is of course God’s perfect, original, and originating cre-
22 Sacrifice Your Love: Psychoanalysis, Historicism, Chaucer (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 2002), 15. On the ‘‘newness’’ of courtly love and its relation to histori-
cal rupture, see 18–19.
23 ‘‘Anima enim facit novas compositiones, licet non faciat novas res; et secundum
quod fingit interius, sic etiam depingit et sculpit exterius’’ (III S. 37. Dub 1), quoted in
E. J. M. Spargo, The Category of the Aesthetic in St. Bonaventure (New York: Franciscan
Institute, 1953), 111. Michael Camille glosses Bonaventure as follows, ‘‘[Bonaventure]
lists chimeras and other fanciful creations of composite art as emblems not of creativity
but of mere synthesis.’’ The Gothic Idol: Ideology and Image-Making in Medieval Art (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 40.
24 Didascalion I, chap. 9, as cited by Camille, The Gothic Idol, 35.
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ation.25 For Aquinas, the astonishing newness of creation exists despite
the eternity of universals as essences of things; it remains linked to di-
vine will, to a power outside human time, and thus is knowable only
through revelation.26 Accordingly, human creative capacity has limited,
derivative access to newness. As for Bonaventure, the newness produced
by human making constitutes mere repetition, a synthesis or reworking
of things already created. Human innovation is thus imitative, not ori-
ginary, a humbler, second-order power able to rearrange preexisting cre-
ation in new ways, but unable really to invent new things.
Lacan remains interested in the paradox at the heart of this Thomistic
argument: for him, as for Aquinas, newness exists despite the existence
of universals, God (for Aquinas) and the Real (for Lacan). 27 Medieval
orthodoxies of creation will prove important throughout Lacan’s Semi-
nar VII, particularly in the lecture ‘‘On Creation ex nihilo,’’ where
‘‘knowledge of the creature and of the creator’’ will be central to his
thinking.28 And here he turns forcefully to a metaphor of creativity long
important to Judeo-Christian tradition, the metaphor of the potter:
‘‘According to a fable handed down through the chain of generations,
and that nothing prevents us from using, we are going to refer to what
is the most primitive of artistic activities, that of the potter.’’29 This
example alludes to the biblical traditions from the books of Jeremiah
and Isaiah, whereby the relation of potter to the clay he molds figures
25 The implications of this tradition for rhetorical inventio will be clearer in my reading
of the tale below.
26 Aquinas writes: ‘‘The newness of the world cannot be demonstrated on the part of
the world itself. For the principle of demonstration is the essence of a thing. Now
everything according to its species is abstracted from ‘‘here’’ and ‘‘now’’; whence it is
said that universals are everywhere and always. Hence it cannot be demonstrated that
man, or heaven, or a stone were not always. . . . But the divine will can be manifested
by revelation, on which faith rests. Hence that the world began to exist is an object of
faith, but not of demonstration or science.’’ Summa Theologiae, Vol. 1: Christian Theology,
trans. Thomas Gilby (Cambridge: Blackfriars; New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), 1.46.2.
27 Erin Labbie reads Lacan’s work precisely as tracking the complex dynamic of the
‘‘universal’’ with the ‘‘particular’’ by way of the structuring principle of the Real, a
universal mode capable of crossing and accommodating various particular changes and
shifts in signification over time. Her cogent account makes clear the myriad ways in
which Lacan’s theorization of an apparently ‘‘universal’’ subject takes considerable inspi-
ration from the ‘‘quarrel of the universals’’ of the scholastics, and is thus particularly
indebted to Thomistic and Boethian philosophical traditions, traditions that, Labbie
argues, Lacan ‘‘turns on their head.’’ See her Lacan’s Medievalism (University of Minne-
sota Press, 2006), ‘‘Introduction,’’ 1–34 (18).
28 The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, 1959–1960: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book VII, ed.
Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Dennis Porter (New York: W. W. Norton, 1992), 115–27.
29 Ibid., 119.
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the relation of God to Israel, of Creator to creature: ‘‘Can I not deal
with you, Israel, says the Lord, as this potter deals with his clay? You
are clay in my hands, like the clay in his, O house of Israel.’’30 Here,
then, is a dominant metaphor for the creation: the divine artisan molds
dead matter into living creature. He is the potter; we are the clay, the
work of his hands.
Reference to the potter simultaneously raises human creative acts and
the orthodox view of human creatureliness, of God’s preeminent posi-
tion as creator; it also for Lacan gestures to the emptiness at the heart
of the Real, a place occupied by the Lady in the courtly love relation.
But, as an artifact that physically encircles an empty space, the vase can
also make it clear that Lacan’s ‘‘nothing’’ has a positive valence; it alludes
to a structural emptiness—such as that around which the human potter
forms the vase. ‘‘Nothing’’ is thus not simply nothing, and recalls the
nihil identified with God’s creative extravagance. ‘‘Nothing’’ is also,
however, simply nothing, gesturing toward the material impossibility at
the heart of this belief (that matter, in other words, can neither be cre-
ated nor destroyed).31
This view of creation plays into Lacan’s understanding of sublimation,
of the place of the Thing (Freud’s das Ding) in his reading of courtly
love. In ‘‘Courtly Love as Anamorphosis,’’ as Fradenburg and Nancy
Frelik have each made clear, Lacan plays with the echoes between subli-
mation and sublime, arguing that processes of sublimation impinge
upon the structures of social and cultural elevation and value alluded to,
in, and through the category of the Sublime, particularly in its godlike
capacity as the unrepresentable, the ineffable, the impossible.32 Courtly
30 Jeremiah 18:6. In Isaiah, the link to God’s preeminence as the source of all created
matter is more explicitly at issue (see, for instance, Isaiah 45:8–11), a point also, if more
obliquely, taken up elsewhere in the wisdom literature. The image of God as artisan, as
potter, will be important to Christian theology in the post-Reformation period as well.
Citations are taken from The New English Bible (New York: Oxford University Press,
1961).
31 ‘‘Nothing’’ can neither be created nor destroyed—nothing is there for God to work
with in the first place; and in Lacanian terms, it remains at the heart of the symbolic
order. Nothing is, thus, the formal heart of all creativity—resonating with Badiou’s
impulse to turn to form—although for Badiou the crucial integer is 1, not 0.
32 Fradenburg, Sacrifice Your Love, 18–20. Nancy Frelick writes, ‘‘For Lacan, the cre-
ation of courtly love is analogous to the appearance of the image in anamorphotic art.
He makes use of this analogy in order to evoke, in a dramatic way, the almost magical
appearance of an image, as if from nowhere, as if from the Real. He also stresses the
self-conscious play of illusion in anamorphotic art which highlights the primacy of the
signifier in a manner analogous to the play on conventions and artifice in Courtly love.’’
‘‘Lacan, Courtly Love, and Anamorphosis,’’ in The Court Reconvenes: Courtly Literature
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love elaborates a cultural value that signifies desire beyond its own limits
or productions; desire, always pursuing the impossibility of its own per-
manent satisfaction (the desiring subject prostrate before the Thing as
cruel and inhuman partner who coldly refuses to be won), and thus
always alluding to something more, something beyond, something im-
possible of representation or achievement. There is, at the heart of this
transaction, a little bit of nothing; the impossible (and/or prohibited)
love object occupies the space of the Thing, a void, a vacuole, an absence
(mis)recognized as cold, inhuman refusal. The signifier comes then to
the rescue, headed for the Thing but detouring around the void, pre-
serving the empty space of the Thing sublimed.33 Creative production
comes out of, even as it circles, this nothing at the heart of the Thing.
Lacan’s account of creation ex nihilo suggests, then, that new creative
productions require a space of nothing they circle and preserve. It sug-
gests, moreover, that certain little nothings like the vase, or the lyrics
of courtly love, or a mechanical horse, can function as representative of
the ‘‘existence of the emptiness at the center of the real that is called
the Thing.’’34
The Squire’s Tale links such drolleries to impossible loves so as to sug-
gest the proximity, rather than the absolute difference, between nothing
and something, rupture and return, novelty and repetition. While pro-
ductive of startling experiences, the little nothings of Chaucer’s exotic
romance, as critics have made clear, would have been quite well known
to a medieval audience, familiar, precisely, as fascinating novelties. The
Squire’s Tale offers, that is to say, a typically ambivalent medieval ac-
count of newness and newfangledness, one that nonetheless suggests the
culture’s considerable enchantment with innovation. Part 1 of the tale
depicts courtly fascination with a series of fabulous birthday gifts given
to Cambyuskan and to his daughter Canacee. A mechanical horse of
brass that can, with the turn of a pin, transport its rider beyond the
bounds of the natural world is the most prominent, and Chaucer’s
Squire castigates the ‘‘lewedness’’ of Cambyuskan’s courtiers, who are
Across the Disciplines, ed. Barbara K. Altmann and Carleton W. Carroll (Rochester, N.Y.:
D. S. Brewer, 2003), 107–14 (111).
33 Medieval traditions of love, Lacan argues, make it clear that the Thing, which
cannot be approached directly, is fundamentally veiled; we can only draw near by way
of detour, encircling, or bypass. A means of approaching the love object yet never at-
taining her, courtly love makes ‘‘the domain of the vacuole stand out,’’ ‘‘at the center
of the signifiers’’ of its discourse. Lacan, ‘‘Courtly Love as Anamorphosis’’ (152, 150).
34 In Bill Brown’s gloss. ‘‘Thing Theory,’’ Critical Inquiry 28 (2001): 1–22 (2).
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unable to explain how the gadget works and ascribe it instead to the
stuff of legend. Critics have regularly read this aspect of Chaucer’s text
as a critique of the naı¨vete´ of enchanted sensibilities. Scott Lightsey finds
here a disenchanted version of an earlier romance admiration for mira-
bilia.35 Yet such readings cannot account for the tale’s own considerable
absorption with newness and fresh-feeling: as John Fyler points out,
taken together, the birthday gifts (which include a magical ring, a mir-
ror, and a sword, as well as the mechanical horse) offer cosmological
renewal, ‘‘a means of reintegration, of recapturing a lost world of fresh-
ness, transparency, and clarity.’’36 Linking the tale even more directly
with innovation, Alan Ambrisco emphasizes Chaucer’s investment in
the new immediacy of the English language, as a fantasy, he argues, of
‘‘flawless’’ communication.37
As this critical tradition makes clear, the tale offers contradictory evi-
dence on the status and meaning of the new. None of these accounts
entirely explains that status, particularly given the fact that the poet
explicitly associates ‘‘newefangelnesse’’ neither with romance mirabilia
nor with language, but, in Part 2 of the tale, with a traumatic experi-
ence of love. In Part 2, a brokenhearted peregrine falcon abandoned by
her beloved tercelet explicitly deplores newness, lamenting a love of
‘‘novelries.’’
Canacee’s Novelties
Juxtaposed with the intriguing novelties given both to Cambyuskan and
to Canacee is the starker, darker story of the self-mutilating peregrine.
Thanks to the gift of a magical ring, Canacee can cross the linguistic
gulf between humans and birds, gaining access to the bird’s sad tale.
This is certainly a new, and stunning, linguistic medium. Canacee’s ex-
cited interest in her gifts—‘‘swich a joye she in hir herte took / Bothe of
35 Lightsey, ‘‘Chaucer’s Secular Marvels.’’ Morton Bloomfield identifies The Squire’s
Tale’s ingenuity not with things medieval but with the ‘‘new spirit of the Renaissance.’’
‘‘Chaucer’s Squire’s Tale and the Renaissance‘‘ Poetica 12 (1979): 28–35 (28). Many crit-
ics have remarked on the attractions of the tale’s own ingenuity, linked to a range of
discourses about its marvels: a composite romance with influences traceable to French,
Arabian, and classical Greek sources and analogues.
36 John Fyler, ‘‘Domesticating the Exotic in the Squire’s Tale,’’ ELH 55 (1988): 1–26.
‘‘But the sword, capable of both healing mayhem and wreaking it, epitomizes the prob-
lematic quality of the others as innocent gifts in a world of experience’’ (3).
37 Alan S. Ambrisco, ‘‘ ‘It lyth nat in my tonge’: Occupatio and Otherness in the
Squire’s Tale,’’ ChauR 38 (2004): 205–28.
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hir queynte ryng and hire mirour, / That twenty tyme she changed hir
colour’’ (V.368–70)—awakes her early, leading her to the garden ram-
ble during which she encounters the peregrine in the first place. Yet this
gadget enables a very old story of infidelity and pain: the lovesick, self-
mutilating falcon has been abandoned by her tercelet, who, too easily
seduced by newfangledness, turned to the love of a scavenger kite. From
the point of view of the peregrine, desire for the new comes bearing the
marks of the death drive.
Such pain is literalized in the bird’s body. As the falcon tells her tale,
she has ‘‘Ybeten . . . hirself so pitously’’ that ‘‘the rede blood / Ran
endelong the tree ther-as she stood’’ (V.414–16). The scene is dramatic,
with the wetness of the peregrine’s red blood running down along the
branches and bark of the dry, white tree in which she sits (V.409). The
peregrine opines that men and birds unhappily share a powerful attrac-
tion to novelties, superficial things that distract them from loves of real
value.
Men loven of propre kynde newefangelnesse,
As briddes doon that men in cages fede.
For though thou nyght and day take of hem hede,
And strawe hir cage faire and softe as silk,
And yeve hem sugre, hony, breed and milk,
Yet right anon as that his dore is uppe
He with his feet wol spurne adoun his cuppe,
And to the wode he wole and wormes ete;
So newefangel been they of hire mete,
And loven novelries of propre kynde,
No gentillesse of blood ne may hem bynde.
(V.610–20)
The peregrine laments an indiscriminate love of the new: men ‘‘loven
novelries of proper kynde.’’ The formulation, twice repeated, marks
novelties ‘‘of propre kynde,’’ literally of a characteristic nature; and the
syntax could be read to suggest both that it is the special, and deplor-
able, characteristic of men to ‘‘loven novelries’’ (an attribute of human-
kind frequently noted in both medieval and early modern literature),
and that newfangled things are loved for the characteristic of newness
they bear. In its context here, the familiar image registers pain and
discontent in ways that converge on social class: just as birds like the
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tercelet spurn their rare cup, slumming after the ignobility of common
worms, so is she, noble raptor, thrown over for a common kite.38 Rather
than signify value, ‘‘newefangelnesse’’ emerges as the stuff of smoke and
mirrors, empty attraction to newness for its own sake.
Chaucer has used this image of the captive bird before, and to some-
what different ends. In Book 3, metrum 2 of his Boece, a caged songbird
(not, notably, a ‘‘noble’’ tercelet) similarly despoils food with dirty feet,
yearning to return to the freedom of the woods. In that context, the
bird’s desire serves as an example of the natural order, the fact that all
things in this world (like lions, like saplings, and like birds) adhere to
their natural place, their ‘‘propre kynde.’’39 Importing this image into
The Squire’s Tale, Chaucer changes the gender of the captive bird (a she,
in Boece, twittering ‘‘with swete voys’’); he also shifts the emphasis from
the caged bird’s desire for freedom (she ‘‘seith the / agreables schadwes
of the wodes, sche defouleth / with hir feet hir metes ischad, and seketh /
mornynge oonly the wode’’ [3, m. 2, lines 27–30]) to the male bird’s
appetite for worms. By changing the caged bird’s gender, Chaucer em-
blematizes the love of the new as, on the one hand, a particularly mascu-
line propensity; the ‘‘men’’ of line 610 now seems gender specific. Yet
the representation of desire shifts, too: desire for a life in the natural
woods, a desire for life beyond the constraining limits of the cage, is
recast as a desire to possess whatever object is lacking, whether or not
the object in question is worthy. The notion that woodland songbirds
naturally long for freedom translates into the propensity of men to yearn
after unavailable things. Chaucer recasts yearning for a specific kind of
liberation into a more complex account of desire, one in which the con-
textual and relational features prove determining: it is the unavailability
of objects, rather than their inherent worth, that renders them desirable.
By associating this form of desire with men’s love of newfangledness,
Chaucer underscores both the contextual and the ambivalent features of
his account of novelty.40
38 Among the discontents of culture registered here may be the limiting boundaries
of class that the Falcon perhaps inadvertently recommends. According to the logic of
courtly love, of course, the falcon should be sublimed, set apart and irreplaceable; she is
shown to be one elevated object in a set of signifiers exchanged and commodified.
39 I am grateful to Frank Grady for drawing my attention to the similarities between
these passages.
40 There is still more to be said about this odd passage, particularly about the special
emphasis here on the caged bird’s desire for ‘‘worms.’’ Worms are hardly newfangled
from a songbird’s perspective; here again, they emerge as new because they have been
so long deferred. The old becomes the new under certain circumstances—and repetition
prevails, functionally as well as rhetorically (this is, after all, a reused image).
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As in her own self-mutilating acts, moreover, the peregrine’s remarks
display the sacrificial impulse embedded in the entire structure: just as
she forfeits safety and bodily ease for the self-abuse she heaps upon her
now bloody breast, so do the men and birds who ‘‘loven novelries,’’ give
up elevated circumstance—sumptuous silks, cups filled with milk and
honey—rejecting the elegant cage and cup in favor of dirt and worms.
Another possible irony here: raptors like the tercelet are birds of prey;
unlike the caged songbirds of the metaphor, they do not ‘‘of propre
kynde’’ desire worms at all. Associating the love of newfangledness with
a desire to eat worms, the peregrine both registers her contempt for the
tercelet’s bad taste and undermines the usual association of the new
with glittery attraction: rather than a fondness for frivolity, the love of
novelty can debase, motivating not the acquisition of luxury but its
sacrifice. This means that if the peregrine, by extension, deplores the
tercelet’s choice, she also and at the same time makes it clear that the
pull of the newfangled is powerful enough to lure one to sacrifice easy
pleasure for it.
Here, then, we see that desire for the new can prompt the sacrifice of
pleasure in favor of what Slavoj Zˇizˇek calls enjoyment (or pleasure in
unpleasure). With regard to sacrifice as a form of desire, Fradenburg
points out that sacrificial discipline (whether of the peregrine or her
erstwhile lover) ‘‘enhances jouissance; it multiplies and extends its possi-
bilities.’’41 In refusing elevated objects, the tercelet extends desire in all
its forms, eventuating in the peregrine’s story and Canacee’s creative
response to it. The desire of the peregrine, still directed toward her
tercelet but now barred from its fulfillment, erupts in self-mutilation
and in poetry both, and she tells her moving story in lovely lines of
verse. The tercelet’s flirtation with the new keeps the peregrine’s satis-
faction deferred, her desire engaged even more now on its newly impos-
sible object. As absent love object, quite literally a ‘‘cruel’’ as well as an
‘‘inhuman partner,’’ the tercelet constitutes the space, the hole around
which the peregrine’s story detours. His flirtation with novelty produces
the nihil out of which she creates.42 This suggests that a desire for nov-
41 This is not how we are accustomed to thinking about it: ‘‘The intimacy between
desire and the law is not one we readily acknowledge. We are so accustomed to pitting
morality against desire that it is simply hard to believe that morality is a form of desire,
or desire is what morality is.’’ Sacrifice Your Love, 7.
42 The gendered roles are reversed here to some degree: for Lacan, the ‘‘nothing’’
sublimed in courtly love, the ‘‘hole,’’ is sexual as well: indeed, much of Lacan’s interest
in courtly love has to do with the erotics of the structure. The constraints of space
prohibit a more detailed consideration of this point.
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elty prompts sacrifice precisely because sacrifice multiplies and extends
possibility: the tercelet’s desire for the new reverberates outward, gener-
ating all kinds of creative productions.
The absent tercelet, that is, constitutes the emptiness around which
the peregrine’s story detours, and it produces both the falcon’s self-
mutilation as well as her poetic refrain. By adopting a central narrative
of loss in love, the tale’s second part keeps us mindful not only of the
complex simultaneity of novelty with painful repetition, but of the ways
this contradictory structure makes legible, to borrow Sarah Kay’s for-
mulation, ‘‘the emergence of the literary object.’’43 Indeed the pere-
grine’s poetic peregrinations invoke a long tradition: faithless lovers
fawn after new loves, leaving their former partners with nothing; this
is, of course, old news, as those references make clear. These are also
stories that Chaucer has himself told before, repeatedly: in The Legend of
Good Women, we hear of Jason’s desertion of Medea (see LGW 1580–
1679) and in Troilus and Criseyde, briefly, of Paris’s desertion of Oenone
for Helen (I.652–56), but more forcefully, of course, of Troilus’s love for
the ultimately faithless Criseyde. If, as Alan Ambrisco argues, The
Squire’s Tale is Chaucer’s reflection on the linguistic innovations of En-
glish, at moments like these the tale remains interested in the ways in
which even ‘‘new’’ languages fall back on older forms, nearly automatic
in their force; innovative poets—like the peregrine, like Chaucer—still
and nonetheless traffic in well-worn phrases, returning us to familiar
and arresting images, or predictable plots.
Old and new, repetition and rupture, remain twinned throughout. It
is not at all coincidental that as we carry on in Part 2, the (old, repeti-
tive) problems engendered by love remain entirely productive for new-
fangled things. Even the peregrine who disdains novelties requires new
salves to heal her wounds.
But Canacee hom bereth hire in hir lappe,
And softely in plastres gan hire wrappe,
Ther as she with hire beek hadde hurt hirselve.
Now kan nat Canacee but herbes delve
Out of the ground, and make salves newe
Of herbes preciouse and fyne of hewe
To heelen with this hauk . . .
(V.635–41)
43 Courtly Contradictions: The Emergence of the Literary Object in the Twelfth Century (Stan-
ford: Stanford University Press, 2001).
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For all its sacrifice of luxury, the new here also registers as ingenuity
capable of refashioning common things to healing ends. Base matter—
roots dug out of the same dirt that carries the common worm—offers
up elevated treasures: precious herbs, beautifully fine. (This is of course
a conventionally Bonaventuran example of human artifice.) Desire now
multiplies and extends toward Canacee, whose healing ministrations ab-
sorb her completely (‘‘Fro day to nyght / she dooth hire bisynesse and
al hire myght’’ [641–42]). Even sumptuousness returns in an elegant
‘‘mewe’’ that Canacee fashions as a sanatorium, adorned with blue velvet
and painted ornamentation, the mark of a generosity designed to heal,
protect, and console her newfound friend. And if the peregrine’s pain is
produced by the other’s captivation by novelty (the tercelet’s faithless-
ness), the other’s captivation with new things (Canacee’s enthusiasms
with magic) also structures the very possibility that her lamentable story
will get either a hearing or a reparative response. Insofar as magic makes
possible a heretofore impossible intercourse, insofar as Canacee’s excite-
ment over her newfound little nothings impels her walk, readying her
ear for ‘‘every thyng / That any fowel may in his leden seyn’’ (V.434–35)
that she will newly hear, the tale links the new to a creative ability to
extend oneself for another, to what Elaine Scarry calls the world-
creating capacity of the imagination, here specifically in the care for the
suffering and injured. Here we see, that is, a hint of the utopian hope
that surrounds all new technologies of communication. Human ears and
lips, touched as if by magic, are rendered more fully capable of hearing
and responding to the sufferings of others, however ‘‘fremde,’’ strange
they may be. Canacee can respond to the peregrine’s piteous cry because
her senses are newly transfigured; she knows what remedy to supply
because her acquaintance with the natural world has been expanded and
enlivened.
Of course, from one view, the tercelet’s hope in newfangledness is
utopian, too, particularly insofar as the newfangled serves as a screen for
those desires, like utopia, impossible to fulfill. This is to say that this
triangulation brings Canacee together with the tercelet through and
across the body of the peregrine, thus revealing the deeply, even madly,
ambivalent nature of Chaucer’s cultural relation to newness here: the
absorption that motivates the smiling face of empathy is the other side
of novelty’s lascivious grin. While these complications are less obviously
at stake in the tale’s Prima Pars, there too we see the way desire and
compulsion—rupture and repetition—might be twinned. If in Part 2
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the living creature threatens death and deadliness, in Part 1 dead metal
takes on the appearance of the living thing.
The Ambition of Gadgets
Chaucer’s Squire’s Tale describes a number of enchanting objects. But it
is the advent of the flying horse of brass that garners the most attention,
constituting something of a breakaway moment in the history of Cam-
byuskan’s court:
For it so heigh was, and so brood and long,
So wel proporcioned for to been strong,
Right as it were a steede of Lumbardye;
Therwith so horsly, and so quyk of ye,
As it a gentil Poilleys courser were.
For certes, fro his tayl unto his ere
Nature ne art ne koude him nat amende
In no degree, as al the people wende.
But everemoore hir mooste wonder was
How that it koude gon, and was of bras . . .
(V.191–200; my emphasis)
Combining liveliness with mechanization, the horse apes nature (‘‘so
horsly . . . As it a gentil Poilleys courser were’’) even as it breaks natural
bonds (‘‘how that it koude gon, and was of bras’’). Chaucer’s neologism,
‘‘horsly,’’ charmingly encodes the novel effect of the artifact come to life:
the toy, as horsey as ever nature made, communicates a quickness of
intelligence even while it stands mute before the court’s gaze. As an
artifact whose form cannot be amended either by nature or by artisanal
skill, the horse outstrips medieval categories of production available for
humanity: repudiating the possibility of amending the object by way
either of Nature or Art, the Squire excludes the two second-order cre-
ative powers that, according to medieval scholastics, follow after God’s
creative force. For all its mechanization, the gadget alludes to a power
of creation beyond human or nature. An extravagant gift from places
unseen, this little nothing appears as if ex nihilo.
In describing the mechanical gadget as ‘‘quyk of ye,’’ Chaucer em-
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phasizes the doubleness of the object’s ‘‘social life’’:44 on the one hand,
the descriptor refers to the court’s visual consumption of the horse—its
liveliness seems to them lifelike; on the other—as a phrase regularly
used to signify vigor and vitality—it raises an impossible possibility: a
metal horse with vibrant ‘‘health.’’ Or better, the horse’s liveliness is
analogical for a mechanized type of sentience: a subject in the invisible
thrall of the death drive. From the point of view of Lacanian theory, this
combination of living vitality and empty metal offers an example of
what Rosalind Krauss calls the ‘‘optical unconscious,’’ automaton as
screen object, both concealing and revealing the subjectivization of the
subject before the power of invisible forces, like the real or the uncon-
scious. In his own discussions of automata, Lacan refers to Aristotle,
where the term is normally translated as ‘‘chance’’; he pairs it with tuche´,
or fate, a term that Lacan elsewhere glosses as ‘‘the encounter with the
real.’’ The automaton emerges as a figure harboring a specter of the
Real, the mechanized features of the living thing under the deadening
sway of compulsion. Daniel Tiffany remarks, following Krauss, that
such a toy serves as ‘‘a spectacular device that discloses, in the name of
science, the immaterial foundation of the object—the invisibility of the
real.’’45 Life figured in dead metal.46
44 Arjun Appaduri, ed., The Social Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspective
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). Sentient objects are of course crucial
to the economies of signification structured by courtly love: the circulation of people as
objects and signifiers. Fradenburg again: ‘‘Courtly love discourse enacts the economy of
‘feudal’ subsistence ‘seen from the perspective of the Thing’—meaning, among other
things, seen as a matter of life and death, as counting absolutely. As a corollary it
performs in the theaters of exchange the loss of the artifact that is interdependent with
its creation, true whether the artifact in question is an abstract instrument (the euro) or
the recollected subject. Courtly love sublimes the very relationship between jouissance and
the movements of the signifier that generate kinship systems, economies, and desiring
subjects’’ (23).
45 Daniel Tiffany, Toy Medium: Materialism and the Modern Lyric (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 2000), 82. See also Lacan, ‘‘Of the Network of Signifiers,’’ ‘‘Tuche´
[fate] and Automaton,’’ and ‘‘The Split between the Eye and the Gaze,’’ The Four Funda-
mental Concepts of Psychoanalysis: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XI, ed. Jacques-Alain
Miller, trans. Alan Sheridan (1977; New York: W. W. Norton, 1998). My thinking is
indebted to Rosalind Krauss, The Optical Unconscious (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,
1993), esp. 71–72.
46 Lightsey writes: ‘‘Chaucer merges the awe inspired by the literary mirabilia of
romance with curiosity about the mechanical marvels that were a part of late-medieval
court life. The text not only confronts the reader with a romance marvel but depicts this
supposedly supernatural motif as an object of rational inquiry. Chaucer often appears to
invite readers to experience marvels as products of human artifice rather than as super-
natural phenomena.’’ ‘‘Chaucer’s Secular Marvels,’’ 316. In his book, Manmade Marvels,
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Even as a novel event, then, the horse of brass alludes to mechaniza-
tion. But it also—here again the ambivalence noted in Part 2 of the
tale—offers the promise of freedom, an ability to break through the
physical limits of the natural world:
This steede of bras, that esily and weel
Kan in the space of o day natureel—
This is to seyn, in foure and twenty houres—
Wher-so yow lyst, in droghte or elles shoures,
Beren youre body into every place
To which youre herte wilneth for to pace,
Withouten wem of yow, thurgh foul or fair;
Or, if yow lyst to fleen as hye in the air
As dooth an egle whan hym list to soore,
This same steede shal bere yow evere moore,
Withouten harm, til ye be ther yow leste,
Though that ye slepen on his bak or reste,
And turne ayeyn with writhyng of a pyn.
(V.115–27)
This description, spoken by the visiting knight who brings the gift to
court, simultaneously foregrounds safety and liminality: even a sleeping
rider is safe, flying between earth and sky, on the brink of danger and
excitement, breaking the bonds of time and space. The description cer-
tainly alludes to the hyper-excitement (and transgressive power) of ex-
perimentation, the fantasy of safely overcoming the impossible,
breaking the physical limits of daily life and of the natural body.
The horse is, however, a ‘‘gyn’’ (a term with a wide semantic range
during the period) and as such, as Lightsey points out, is of an ambigu-
ous character. But ‘‘gyn’’ was a term with an even wider semantic range
than Lightsey emphasizes; the MED notes various usages, from the Old
French gin, or engien, linked to the Latin, ingenium; it is etymologically
linked to the modern word engine. Gyn and engyn (and their French and
Latin cognates) occur frequently in romance (ingenium is an important
word to Geoffrey of Monmouth, particularly in relation to his own cre-
ative production, and the ambiguities of its meaning in the Historia
Lightsey de-emphasizes this question of what we might call the tale’s investment in
‘‘disenchantment’’ (74–80).
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Regum Britannie have been usefully debated by critics).47 The potential
for deceit, the ambiguity of motive and purpose, inherent in the word
could equally apply to feats of engineering and to linguistic creations,
to mechanical contrivances and philosophical ingenuities. In this regard,
in view of these links between artifact and art, we might recall that
fables of ‘‘Virgil, the Necromancer’’—stories of the magical, mechanical
ingenuities that Virgil was purported to have made—flourished particu-
larly in the late fourteenth century, and at the time of Chaucer’s writ-
ing.48 Poetic maker as magician as engineer. That is, if romance helped
materially to produce gadgets (as Lightsey compelling shows), it might
itself be figured as a gadget encoding the very same ambiguities of
meaning and purpose, with its own fine array of gadgets, bells, and
whistles.
The tale emphasizes the energetic efforts of this sophisticated court
to sort through the meaning and workings of the impossible thing be-
fore them: ‘‘It was a fairye’’; ‘‘They murmureden as dooth a swarm of
been, / And maden skiles after hir fantasies’’ (V.201; 204–5). It is true,
as many have argued, that Chaucer’s Squire explicitly disdains the en-
thusiasms of Cambyuskan’s courtiers; their debate and ‘‘jangle,’’ he im-
plies, shows a fuzzy-headed fascination with magic, leading many to
read the tale as a demystification of wonder in favor of the rationality
of science. Yet, as Lightsey suggests, following Mary Campbell’s work,
wonder and science are more closely related here than many readings of
The Squire’s Tale acknowledge.49
Furthermore, whatever the dramatic features of Chaucer’s Squire’s
attitude, the description of the court’s response emphasizes not the spe-
cial stupidity of this particular group, but the commonness of such puz-
zlement before subtle things: ‘‘As lewed peple demeth comunly / Of
thynges that been maad moore subtilly / Than they kan in hir lewed-
nesse comprehende; / They demen gladly to the badder ende’’ (V.221–
24). If we can read here the Squire’s self-satisfied superiority, we can also
read the courtiers’ predicament in trying to recover from the fascination
47 Martin Shichtman and Laurie Finke, ‘‘Profiting from the Past: History as Symbolic
Capital in the Historia Regum Britanniae,’’ Arthurian Literature 12 (1994): 1–35; Michelle
Warren, History on the Edge: Excalibur and the Borders of Britain, 1100–1300 (Minneapo-
lis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000); Ingham, Sovereign Fantasies.
48 On fables of Virgil the Necromancer, see John Spargo, Virgil the Necromancer: Stud-
ies in Virgilian Legend (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1934).
49 Mary Campbell, Wonder and Science: Imagining Worlds in Early Modern Europe (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1999).
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produced by this radically anomalous event, in trying to make sense of
the (as yet) nonsensical, or to assimilate the radically new. And if the
courtiers are ignorant of the automaton’s mechanics, they are certainly
not unlearned: the text repeatedly emphasizes the array of authorities
referred to in their debate from the widest range of the Liberal Arts:
poetry (stories of Pegasus and of the Trojan horse), philosophy (Aris-
totle), and the science of optics (Alhazan and Witello, authorities on
optics and on perspective), all authorities known in the West. Taken as
a whole, the scene repeatedly draws attention not to the insufficiency of
this particular audience of knowers but to an experience of epistemologi-
cal poverty as such, of the difficulty (altogether common) of knowing
what to make of something never before seen or experienced.
Criticism, too, has seemed to embrace this flying horse as imaginative
enigma, despite evidence to the contrary. In a fascinating but largely
overlooked essay, Marijane Osborn argues that the Squire’s steed of
brass is in fact an astrolabe, one equipped with a governing horse’s head
(operated by the turning of a pin) at its top.50 Osborn persuasively links
the Squire’s description to similar descriptive moments in A Treatise on
the Astrolabe, patiently explaining the precise workings of the mechanical
contraption.51 From the larger vantage of Chaucer’s corpus, then, even
this new thing is not so new after all; a literal repetition, the Squire’s
‘‘steed of brass’’ is a well-wrought urn that Chaucer has wrought before.
Even those novel items that stun and startle the senses remain entangled
with earlier figures and forms. Furthermore, the fact that recent criti-
cism on the tale, including analyses of its man-made marvels, continues
to overlook the horse as astrolabe despite Osborn’s reading suggests
the critical afterlife of the very epistemological difficulty experienced by
Cambyuskan’s courtiers.
The problem of the court’s ‘‘lewedness’’ alludes, then, not to the fail-
ings of a particularly unsubtle, or easily fascinated, audience before the
50 Marijane Osborn, ‘‘The Squire’s ‘Steed of Brass’ as Astrolabe: Some Implications
for The Canterbury Tales,’’ in Hermeneutics and Medieval Culture, ed. Patrick J. Gallacher
and Helen Damico (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 121–31.
51 From A Treatise on the Astrolabe (Riverside Chaucer): ‘‘Thyn Astrolabe hat a ring to
putten on the thombe of thy right hond in taking the height of thinges’’ (I, 1). ‘‘Than
is there a large pyne in manere of an extre [axel tree], that goth thorugh the hole that
half the tables of the clymates and the riet in the wombe of the moder; thorugh which
pyn ther goth a litel wegge, which that is clepd the horse, that steynth allthese parties
to-hepe’’ (I, 14). Further assessment of the implications of this connection must be
deferred at present. I am grateful to Peter Travis for drawing my attention to Osborn’s
work.
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transformative power of novelty—even if that is the Squire’s own un-
subtle conclusion—but to the arresting power of fascination (wonder is,
after all, the way desire looks from the perspective of the death drive)
and to the problem (both epistemological and ethical) of what to make
of, and what to do with, new things. Confronted with the incredible,
the courtiers bring all their best learning to bear on the problem; they
cannot, however, solve it with the knowledge available to them. Cer-
tainly their energetic response—like Canacee’s—shows a renewed en-
gagement in the material details of the world before them. That said,
their wonder has different effects from hers. While the horse begs for
experimental testing, neither rational debate nor fascinated wonder
changes the court’s behavior. Despite precise instruction as to how one
might ride it, the horse is taken instead to Cambyuskan’s tower, stock-
piled ‘‘among his jueles leeve and deere’’ (V.341), while this king who
is earlier described as ‘‘hardy’’ and ‘‘wys’’ as well as ‘‘riche’’ (V.19), ‘‘Re-
peireth to his revel as biforn’’ (V.339). Despite the clearly disruptive
nature of the event, nothing much changes at Cambyuskan’s court.
In The Squire’s Tale, then, novelty oscillates between old patterns and
startling ruptures, alluding both to the frustrations of desire and to
human ingenuity in the production of new things and new relations.52
Chaucer’s tale renders ‘‘newefangelnesse’’ as inherently paradoxical, a
feature of creative production that simultaneously produces breakaway
moments, even as it partakes of older, repetitive forms. We should note,
moreover, that both Canacee’s remarkable discovery of a talking bird
and the court’s equally remarkable experience of a flying mechanical
horse suggest the possibility for a fundamental restructuring of percep-
tion and expectation that Badiou identifies with the event. That restruc-
turing may well be necessary for a ‘‘new universalism,’’ as Badiou argues,
but by offering Cambyuskan’s response to the flying horse as a counter-
example, Chaucer’s poem suggests that the event is not sufficient to pro-
52 Here the structure of courtly love, in other words, sublimes the Thing (Das Ding)
even as the new things produced seem themselves to promise relief, however temporary,
from the deadliness of pain, loss, mutilation. Recent accounts of ‘‘thing theory’’ have
parsed precisely this difference between the object and the Thing. Alluding both to
Lacanian accounts of the Thing as well to particular objects that can front those moves,
Bill Brown notes that the Thing ‘‘lies beyond the grid of intelligibility, outside the order
of objects’’ as a ‘‘relief from ideas.’’ ‘‘This is also why,’’ he continues, ‘‘the Thing becomes
the most compelling name for that enigma that can only be encircled and which the
object (by its presence) necessarily negates.’’ I would argue, in contrast, that some ob-
jects, like the automaton, place us ineluctably before it. Brown, ‘‘Thing Theory,’’ 11–12.
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duce change. As far as we can tell, Cambyuskan seeks neither
knowledge nor action; he trades the stupefaction of the event for the
stupefaction of drunkenness. Canacee and the peregrine, in contrast,
engage their initial scene of fascination by crafting lines of poetry, think-
ing, planning, even digging in the dirt so as to craft new things used to
compassionate ends. To be sure, the peregrine’s future is left open: Will
the magical bird in her sumptuous enclosure become one of Canacee’s
collectibles, on a par with Cambyuskan’s tower filled with jewels and
gadgets? The tale’s incompletion offers no answer.
But in avoiding an answer, The Squire’s Tale also implies that the
event demands, to some degree, a willingness to entertain, rather than
immediately to resolve, the double-face of newness. This is an ethical
demand that authorizes pleasure in the wonder of the world even as
it takes on the problem of what relations—whether compassionate or
consumptive—such pleasure might itself authorize and produce. The
technological know-how with which the tale is fascinated depends upon
an attachment to a creative rationality from which enchanted desire can
never entirely divorce itself.53 In its elaboration of such an ambivalent
view of novelty, romance operates as a kind of double-helix entwining
old with new, an engine driven by and driving the desire to feel afresh,
to begin again. This doubleness may well be why romance seems blind
to its own well-documented (even luridly overdetermined) excesses. And
it is here that we might reconsider the exoticism of the tale—its setting
in ‘‘Tartarye,’’ at the court of Genghis Khan and with that court’s re-
sponse to gifts from the King ‘‘of Arabe and of Inde.’’ And so I turn,
finally, to the view of enchantment and disenchantment as a means
of reconsidering the history of relations between Europe and what was
constructed, in the Middle Ages, as the East.
Conclusion: Exotic Calculations
Cambyuskan’s court, like Asian courts generally, had a reputation for
sophistication and cosmopolitanism, in marked contrast to England,
53 Scholars have, moreover, linked Cambyuskan’s horse rather directly to the matter
of poetry. Reading of the classical sources to which Chaucer’s poem alludes, Craig Berry
describes the automaton as ‘‘an amazing piece of technology, and as a model of poetic
inspiration which elides the difference between engineering and artistry,’’ ‘‘a model well-
suited to a poet who served as Clerk of the Works and wrote The Treatise on the Astrolabe’’
(292). If Lightsey positions poetry as a contributing cause to mechanical productions,
Berry here emphasizes the similarities—not the differences—between the making of
things and the making of poetry. Berry, ‘‘Flying Sources: Classical Authority in Chau-
cer’s Squire’s Tale,’’ ELH 68 (2001): 287–313.
PAGE 78
78
................. 17457$ $CH3 10-15-09 13:36:51 PS
LITTLE NOTHINGS
something of a backwater even in Europe. From the twelfth century
onward, the ‘‘east’’ was an important source of knowledge about philos-
ophy, natural science, mechanics, and the source of a host of fascinating
gadgets such as water clocks or table fountains. It is well known by
now that many of the gizmos and gadgets described in romance have
intriguing links to ‘‘Eastern’’ culture—Joseph Needham surmises that
mechanized timekeepers from China may have inspired the develop-
ment in Europe of mechanical clocks through a process he terms ‘‘stimu-
lus diffusion’’54—and, as The Squire’s Tale makes clear, in romances these
cross-cultural settings are regularly noted.
Medieval romance has long been positioned amid the intercultural
interactions of Islam with Christianity; yet medieval cooperation among
various peoples of the book has been identified not with romance, but
with what Sheila Delany has called the ‘‘rational scholarly approach.’’
Delany and others have identified such ‘‘rationality’’ with the work of
the School of Toledo, and with the intellectual indebtedness of scholasti-
cism to Arabic texts and traditions. Delany in fact opposes the respect
for Islam within theological and political treatises, to an older ‘‘mythic’’
‘‘patristic and popular orientalism . . . embodied in stories of sexual
desire.’’55 To be sure, much recent work on medieval romance (including
my own) has emphasized the conquering impulse of these texts. Yet if
romances regularly narrate stories of conquest by way of stories of sexual
desire, they also, as we see here, pair desire with intriguing accounts of
technology and its fascinations. Given the full range of such references,
Delany’s opposition between ‘‘rational/scientific’’ and ‘‘mythic’’ realms
of culture seems overdrawn. The romance genre’s enchantment with
new things might prove indexical for a different story about medieval
enchantment from the one currently on display.
Max Weber, we recall, linked the ‘‘rule’’ of rationality over the power
of ‘‘enchantment’’ with modern Western culture: ‘‘Western civilization,’’
Weber writes, ‘‘is distinguished from every other by the presence of men
with a rational ethos for the conduct of life. Magic and religion are
found everywhere; but a religious basis for conduct that, when consis-
tently followed, had to lead to a specific form of rationalism is again
peculiar to Western civilization.’’56
54 See Needham, Science and Civilization in China, vol. 4, part 2 (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1965).
55 Sheila Delany, The Naked Text: Chaucer’s ‘‘Legend of Good Women’’ (Berkeley and Los
Angeles: University of California Press, 1994), 186.
56 Max Weber is quoted in Huff and Schluchter, eds., Max Weber and Islam, 76.
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This seems an apt description of what Delany would term the puta-
tively ‘‘tolerant’’ rationalism of the scholars and scholastics. Yet Chau-
cer’s tale argues—pace Weber and Delany both—that Europe’s
enchantments with the considerable achievements of Islamic and Asian
cultures were rational and amorous in equal measure. The ‘‘rational/
scientific’’ realm is as compromised by desire and aggression as is its
‘‘mythic’’ twin. Desire and thought emerge, explicitly in romance, as
more proximate than opposed. Chaucer’s tale invites us to consider such
enchantments as problem and opportunity both, drawing us into an
ethical uncertainty that he here refuses to settle. And insofar as romance
regularly insists upon the doubleness of these enchanted novelties, the
genre registers the paradoxical nature of desire. It allows us to see that
the fascination with body and matter that motivates conquest and con-
sumption can never entirely be divorced from that version of delight
that marks the beginning of human invention, and inhabits our attach-
ments to one another.57
57 Cultures throughout history regularly (and understandably) evince ambivalence
about technology; medieval accounts of its promise and perils should not compromise
our understanding of the ambitions of such fascinating gadgets. No small part of the
medieval/antitechnological attitude emerges not from the medievals themselves, but
from some of the founders of the discipline of medieval studies. I am thinking particu-
larly of Henry Adams’s ‘‘The Virgin and the Dynamo’’ (1900), which pits what Adams
saw as an organic, religious, medieval sensibility (emblematized for him in the cathedral
of Chartres, dedicated to the Virgin Mary) against what he termed a modern, industrial-
ized, and dehumanizing spirit of the twentieth century. See also Lynn White’s effort to
refute Adams, ‘‘Dynamo and Virgin Reconsidered,’’ American Scholar 27 (1958):
183–94.
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